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LEGAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF




CREATING free trade areas is often one of the first deliberate ef-
forts in regional integration, whereas there are some uninten-
tional integrations that take place as a result of increased trade
relations, production site migration, cross-border capital flows, foreign
exchange arrangements, and movement of labor.1 Financial stability has
become an area in which regional integration is not an objective but an
outcome of the efforts that have been made in the last decade.
In Eastern Asia, there have been various economic groupings, but until
recently little effort has been made to promote regional integration. This
was more for historical reasons than anything, as South East Asians have
been traditionally skeptical of communism and Japan. Despite this, Ja-
pan's economic growth beginning in the 1950s had a large economic ef-
fect on Asian countries, not only economically but also philosophically.
Asian countries tried to emulate the economic growth by following the
economic model of Japan which led to such terms as the Asian Miracle.2
Despite this seemingly close economic relationship among Asian econ-
omies; Japan has been very slow to react to any possibility of regional
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1. This intentional regionalism has been called regionalisation as opposed to the mar-
ket-driven, economic interdependence that takes place unintentionally, simply
called regionalism by one author. Chia Siow Yue. 2002. "East Asia Regional-
ism." Paper presented at East Asian Cooperation: Progress and Future Agenda,
Institute of Asia Pacific Studies (CASS) and Research Center for APEC and East
Asian Cooperation (CASS), Beijing, August 22-23, 2002, cited in EAST ASIA INTE-
GRATES: A TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR SHARED GROWTH 82 (Kathie Krumm &
Homi Kharas eds., The World Bank 2003).
2. The East Asian Miracle posits that an appropriate combination of public policy/
government intervention assists the process of economic development. WORLD
BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1993).
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integration, as it has been strongly committed, both economically and po-
litically, to the United States' interest since World War II. Only after
losing its economic dominance during the 1990s has it started to negotiate
free trade agreements (FTAs) with Asian states.
In the past decade, East Asia has been accelerating the pace of regional
integration, especially as a result of the activities of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Asian financial crises in 1997
and 1998 prompted various financial and monetary arrangements to seek
greater safety and soundness of the financial systems as well as an alter-
native to International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance. There is also
greater political will to establish the institutional progress which was lack-
ing in the past.3
Regional integration affects the financial system, as the frontiers of
states are no longer a critical boundary of activity. The state is no longer
the sole dominant actor in international law, with corporations and indi-
viduals now strongly influencing the decision of states.4 International or-
ganizations exert an immense impact on the international legal scene: for
example, certain multilateral institutions may be seen as making law
through their resolutions and recommendations. 5 Case law has been ac-
cumulating through a variety of non-judicial international dispute settle-
ment systems. 6
As the Asian financial crisis demonstrated, the vast inflows and out-
flows of capital have made it necessary to consider an integrated structure
of financial monitoring and supervision.7 Ad hoc measures may have
been sufficient in the past, but whether such an approach would now be
sufficient is questionable, with financial markets evolving faster than reg-
ulators can develop regulatory measures. 8
This article explores the legal, regulatory, and political impacts emanat-
ing from efforts to achieve regional integration in the East Asian financial
3. The CMI is the strongest indication of the political will of regional financial inte-
gration in East Asia. The CMI is discussed in detail infra § V.A.
4. For example, the activities of the U.S. Trade Representative does not necessarily
target trade liberalization of countries with a relatively rigid trade regime, but
targets countries in which the American business community has an interest. Kal
Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 415-17 (2000).
5. E.g., UN General Assembly Resolutions are considered as international law, but
they do not have any binding effect. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 14 (5th ed. 1998).
6. E.g., cases settled through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO are
considered to be legally binding. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
GATT & THE WTO 165 (Cambridge University Press 2000).
7. This has been emphasized in many reports on the reform of the international fi-
nancial architecture. See Final Report of the International Financial Institution Ad-
visory Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 106th Con. (2000).
8. This was demonstrated by the Basel Committee's approach using the internal
rating system of financial institutions for risk assessment instead of regulators pur-
suing the objective of risk assessment. BASEL COMMITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVI-
SION, RANGE OF PRACTICE IN BANKS' INTERNAL RATINGS SYSTEMS (2000) (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision discussion paper), available at http://www.bis.
org/publ/bcbs66.pdf.
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and monetary sphere. Financial and monetary cooperation has become a
strong force geared toward regional integration, with law-making effects.
The next section examines the legal order in East Asia. Section three
turns to assessment of the economic and financial groupings in East Asia,
and section four reviews the proposals made in relation to the establish-
ment of a regional stability fund. The fifth section analyzes attempts at
financial cooperation. Lastly, the sixth section evaluates monetary sover-
eignty, legal and regulatory changes, and the political effects of regional
integration.
II. LEGAL ORDER IN THE EAST ASIAN REGION
While in recent years there has been an increasing tendency of East
Asians to resort to formal legal procedures, most prefer informal rela-
tionship-frameworks and ad hoc problem-solving to universal principles
and public-decision making based on contractual and other legal
frameworks. 9 But many have criticized this approach for resulting in
cronyism, which in turn has led to unsound credit decisions.
The taxonomy of legal order in East Asia is diverse and complex.
Given the colonial backdrop of the region, the foundation of the legal
system in many of the countries takes after their former colonial powers'
legal systems (e.g., Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore follow an En-
glish common law system, while the Indonesian system is similar to the
Dutch one). Other non-colonized nations also looked to foreign models
(e.g., China and Japan follow the German model). 10 This diversity has
also been reinforced as a result of subsequent amendments and recent
liberalization measures followed by the states. 1
Diversity aside, there is one common aspect to East Asian legal sys-
tems: the top-down, rule-making, and policy-oriented (i.e., discretion-
based) legislation. A majority of these countries have basic democratic
institutions, such as independent legislature, executive, and judicial
branches. But authoritarian political leadership or vested economic in-
terests often supersede democratic decision-making.
This phenomenon was analyzed in an Asian Development Bank
(ADB) commissioned study.' 2 The legal system in relation to economic
development is considered from two dimensions. First, the allocative di-
mension can be identified where the legal rules state whether the state or
the market allocates economic resources. Second, the procedural dimen-
9. Miles Kahler, Institution-Building in the Pacific, in PACIFIC COOPERATION: BUILD-
ING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REGIMES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (Andrew
Mark & John Ravenhill eds., 1995).
10. Korea, a former colony of Japan, follows Germany style.
11. Especially after the financial crisis in 1997, countries that accepted IMF support
have taken a wide range of liberalization measures such as increasing the limit of
foreign ownership of banks. See MAMIKO Yokoi-Arai, FINANCIAL STABILITY IS-
SUES, THE CASE OF EAST ASIA (2002).
12. See THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT 1960-1995 (Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons eds., 1998) [hereinafter
THE ROLE OF LAW].
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sion is whether decisions are primarily rule-based or discretionary: espe-
cially legal and administrative institutions.
Considering the allocative dimension, many Asian nations have a
strong leader or elite administration for effective decision-making. They
are regarded as capable of making more efficient decisions than the mar-
ketplace. Examples would include Malaysia's former Prime Minister
Mahatir 13 and China's Communist Party's Central Committee. 14
As to the procedural dimension, recourse to meaningful and fair ad-
ministrative processes and judicial review, indicate the willingness of a
government to accept scrutiny and to overhaul unlawful decisions.
Though due process guarantees and judicial review in administrative law
are not totally unknown in East Asia, they are not well-developed for
challenging state decisions. Excessive and discretion-based administra-
tive rule-making continues to impede the effectiveness of judicial supervi-
sion over administrative acts.15
III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN ASIA
Institutionalization is a means to formalize the process of regional inte-
gration, with the adoption of treaties and by-laws assisting this process.
States would be required to make greater commitments, including efforts
to negotiate even in unfavourable situations. They would be bound to
engage in discussions and to disclose information for the greater welfare
of financial stability, which they might have previously described as
against their national pride. In exchange, they would be offered financial
assistance and international support in the context of financial distress.
Engaging in discussion would also enable the interests of member states
to be duly reflected in the process of adopting rules and standards, which
in turn would encourage their implementation in those states. Forums
are often good starting points for engagement, with attempts at institu-
tionalisation spurring integration.
A. ADB
The ADB is the only formal, regional financial institution. As a legal
entity, the ADB is the only institution vested with the capacity to enter
into treaties and to establish its own by-laws. 16
The ADB has been active in seeking regional-initiatives including the
13. Prime Minister Mahatir has been the prime minister of Malaysia from 1981 to
2003. His power and authority over the country was demonstrated during the
Asian financial crisis when he made the decision to terminate the outflow of for-
eign currency from Malaysia despite opposition from outsiders.
14. All legislations that pass through the National People's Congress or its standing
committee must be approved by the Communist Party Politburo beforehand.
15. See THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 12, at 259.
16. The ADB is established by the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank and the By-Laws of the Asian Development Bank. Agreement Establishing
The Asian Development Bank (1966), available at www.adb.org/Documents[Re-
ports/Charter/charter.pdf.
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Regional Stability Fund.1 7 ADB has set up the Regional Economic Mon-
itoring Unit which undertakes the ASEAN Surveillance Process.18 Fur-
ther, the ADB has recently established the Asian Regional Information
Center. 19
If any regional stability fund were to be established in Asia, ADB
would either play a major role or its function would need to be reconsid-
ered. This is probably the reason why it has been active in involving itself
in such discussion. 20 The ADB has the institutional structure necessary
for it to function as a regional institution, with the financial resources and
expertise available. But its diverse membership may inhibit its role as a
financial regulator, since some of the members are simply not prepared to
accept any advanced financial regulation. Member states include non-
Asian states which might oppose such initiatives.
In recent years, the ADB's initiative to become the institutional basis
for any fund in Asia is getting stronger. It is becoming increasingly con-
cerned with taking part in regional cooperation activities 2' and has pro-
posed an Asian Reserve Bank for which the ADB provides institutional
structure.
22
B. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC)
APEC furnishes both benefits and difficulties by virtue of its wide
ranging membership including the United States, Canada, Australia, Ja-
pan, and several Latin American countries. The United States, Canada,
and Australia have been the driving force of APEC, and have led the
institution towards their own goals. Nevertheless, the dominance of these
three Western countries has led Asian countries to withdraw from active
discussions within this forum.
C. ASEAN
ASEAN has become the main vehicle for East Asia to influence the
outside world. Its non-intervention policy among members has been the
17. See infra § III.
18. See infra § IV.C for details of the ASEAN Surveillance Process.
19. See Asian Regional Information Center, About Us, http://www.aric.adb.org/index.
asp.
20. The ADB has assisted in the region by providing surveillance services where it had
a comparative advantage. Asian Development Bank, Support to the ASEAN Sur-
veillance Process, http://www.adb.org/REMU/asean.asp (last visited Sept. 17,
2005).
21. E.g., ADB sponsored a conference with the Bo'ao Forum in October 2002 and
spoke of the need to develop regional public goods, echoing the United Nations
appeal to deal with global public goods. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, MOVING
REGIONAL COOPERATION FORWARD (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.adb.org/
documents/ conference / moving , regional cooperation -forward / proceedings. pdf;
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
22. Ramgopal Agarwala & Brahm Prakash, Regional Cooperation in Asia: Long-term
Progress, Recent Retrogression, and the Way Forward, (ADB ERD Working Paper
Series No. 28, 2002).
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bonding principle as well as the main obstacle to its institutional evolve-
ment. ASEAN discusses issues beneficial to its members but avoids hard
issues that could cause loss of face to any member. As a result, it has
accomplished expansion, but it has been prevented from contemplating
any effective resolution concerning politically controversial matters such
as crisis management, civil liberties, environmental protection, or separa-
tist movements. 23
At the inception of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN was re-
luctant to assist fellow members to confront their allegedly mistaken deci-
sions. But ASEAN has since been making a concerted effort to appeal its
concern to international financial institutions.
In the financial sector, ASEAN's first move, in 1977, was to sign a swap
agreement between member states' central banks and monetary authori-
ties. The member states have continuously renewed the agreement, and
the bilateral swap arrangement has now been expanded into the Chang
Mai Initiative (CMI).
One of the greatest developments in the monetary field of ASEAN is
the Bilateral Payments Arrangement (BPA) proposed by the Special Task
Force of ASEAN Central Banks. 24 This arrangement was proposed to
reduce the dependency on the U.S. dollar. Intra-regional trade settle-
ment would be conducted by local currencies to save foreign currencies
for trade with the United States and Europe. This has led to a web of
agreements in the form of the CMI, which is discussed in detail below.
In the wake of the crisis, ASEAN has taken opportunities to lobby
international support for their economies and the relaxation of IMF con-
ditionality.25 An Informal ASEAN Senior Finance and Central Banks
Deputies Meeting was held in November 1997, and they agreed on the
New Framework for Enhanced Asian Regional Cooperation (the so-
called Manila Framework). The implementation of this framework was
confirmed by the Finance Ministers on the following day, December 1,
1997, in their Joint Ministerial Statement, Special ASEAN Finance Minis-
ters Meeting. The Manila Framework aims to implement the following
objectives: the enhancement of regional surveillance; the strengthening of
economic and technical cooperation; support for measures to strengthen
the IMF's capacity to respond to financial crises; and support for the pro-
posed measures of cooperative financing that would supplement the
23. ASEAN failed to act on the occasions such as the Asian financial crisis, the inde-
pendence of East Timor, and the forest fires that inflicted South-East Asia in 1998.
24. Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Press Statement of
the 2nd ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (Feb. 28, 1998), available at http://
www.aseansec.org/740.html.
25. Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Statement by the ASEAN
Finance Ministers and the Finance Ministers of Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR
China, Japan, Korea and the United States, (Dec. 2, 1997), available at http://www.
aseansec.org/1945.htm; Press Release, Joint Press Statement of the 2nd ASEAN
Finance Ministers Meeting, supra note 24.
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IMF's resources. 26 Regional surveillance was proposed so that members
can monitor each other through peer pressure, rather than through inter-
national financial institutions such as IMIF. Surveillance was to be ini-
tially placed in the ADB and taken over by the ASEAN Secretariat in
due course.27 This was subsequently transferred to ADB as the ASEAN
Surveillance Process, and ASEAN has been publishing reports on the ec-
onomic and financial developments taking place in ASEAN countries. 28
In recent years, ASEAN has increased its clout by integrating China,
Japan, and Korea in some of its key decisions, creating a new grouping:
ASEAN+3. ASEAN+3 has been active in the area of financial coopera-
tion and trade agreements. ASEAN+3 established a finance ministers
and central bank governors meeting in 1999, which issued joint state-
ments.2 9 Significantly, ASEAN+3 has agreed to establish regional early
warning systems that would contribute to a systematic detection of any
irregular economic changes. 30 It is the founding group of the CMI, which
will also enter into FrAs.3 1
D. EXECUTIVES' MEETING OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC
CENTRAL BANKS (EMEAP)
EMEAP was created in 1990 to promote cooperation of central banks
in the Asian Pacific Region.32 As a cooperative organization of central
banks and monetary authorities in the East Asian and Pacific region, it
also facilitates the exchange of information. The Bank of Japan led its
establishment when it was seeking a forum to discuss policy issues with
Asian-Pacific central banks. The meetings were confidential and infor-
mal until 1996, when the group decided to elevate the meetings to the
Governor level.
EMEAP consists of eleven members and has not accepted any addi-
26. Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Ministerial State-
ment o the Special ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, (Dec. 1, 1997), available at
http://aseansec.org/1943.htm.
27. Press Release, Joint Press Statement of the 2nd ASEAN Finance Ministers Meet-
ing, supra note 24.
28. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Finance Cooperation, http://
aseansec.org/6319.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
29. The most recent statement by the ASEAN+3 was made on May 10, 2002. Press
Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Ministerial Statement of
the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting,(May 10, 2002), available at http://asean
sec.org/6345.htm.
30. Id.
31. ASEAN has already been developing an ASEAN Free Trade Area that is in the
process of reducing tariffs on all products listed in their 2002 inclusion list to 0-5%.
ASEAN is now in bilateral negotiations with the ASEAN+3 countries on FTAs.
See Ramon Clarete et al., Asian Regionalism and Its Effects on Trade in the 1980s
and 1990s (ADB ERD Working Paper Series No. 30, 2002).
32. Members of EMEAP are Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. EMEAP, What
is EMEAP? (July 2003) at http://www.emeap.org.
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tional members since its inception.33 The supreme authority lies with the
Governors' Meeting, which meets annually. Governors decide on the ba-
sic policies and direction of the working groups. Themes discussed at
their meetings have been focused so as to capture the policy issues in the
region. 34
The Deputies' Meeting is the primary forum of the group since its es-
tablishment; it is held biannually. Deputies coordinate the activities of
the working groups and select topics or issues to be discussed by the Gov-
ernors or working groups. The Deputies' Meeting maintains continuity in
the operation of EMEAP and attempts to cope with any emergencies.
At the first Governors' Meeting in 1996, EMEAP formed working
groups to study policy issues of special concern to central banks in the
region. Reform of the group was timely in the sense that most of the
members were influenced by the crisis in 1997, and that central banks had
a forum to discuss these issues. Japan played an intermediary role be-
tween the international organizations and G10 35 central banks. Never-
theless, the issues discussed in the group have tended to be taken over by
the respective finance ministers at crucial moments when financing is
necessary.
As a result of an increased need for dialogue in times of massive capital
flows, EMEAP created three working parties36 in 1996 with a view to
practical collaboration. As a result of the work of the working groups,
the Basel Committee now recognizes EMEAP as the regional banking
supervisory group alongside SEANZA. 37 EMEAP has made progress in
matters of concern to central banks such as repurchase agreements for
U.S. treasury bills and Japanese government bonds (JGB),38 and the es-
tablishment of a confidential communication network that can be used to
coordinate foreign exchange intervention.
33. Members are Reserve Bank of Australia, People's Bank of China, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank
Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Bank of Thailand. Id.
34. Themes have been: means of strengthening central bank cooperation to enhance
financial stability and market development in the region, asset prices and impact
on monetary policy, and relationship between international investment and finan-
cial stability. Id.
35. G10 is the Group of Ten industrialized countries; Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States which consult and co-operate on economic, monetary and
financial matters.
36. The working groups were central bank reserves, banking supervision, and financial
market structures. Id.
37. See YoKoI-ARPi, supra note 11, at ch. 5. SEANZA is the South East Asia, New
Zealand and Australia Forum of Banking Supervision formed by central bankers
of those countries to provide training of senior staff through intensive courses on
specific problems and issues to central banks.
38. The repurchase agreements are agreements between central banks (in this case
bilateral) that one central bank will provide either dollar or yen (depending on the
security involved) with the collateral of treasury bills or JGBs. After a predeter-
mined period, the holder of the collateral will sell back the collateral on a prede-
termined basis.
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The influence of EMEAP was limited due to the secrecy of the meet-
ings. Further, it lacked institutional commitment and influence on each
others supervisory methodology. This was most evident during the Asian
crisis when it failed to act as a group. But it is viewed as a possible insti-
tutional basis for a regional organization and has produced reports that
are influencing the outlook of regional economic cooperation. 39 In re-
cent years, EMEAP has launched the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) which is
discussed in detail below.
E. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS) ASIA
The BIS opened its Representative Office for Asia and the Pacific, its
first overseas office, in Hong Kong in July 1998. There are two strong
reasons for the BIS to branch out its operations in Asia. The first is the
fact that 25 percent of BIS' deposits are from central banks in Asia. The
second is that the time difference with Basel makes the reserve manage-
ment of Asian central banks difficult. There is a third implicit objective
which is to integrate the opinion of Asian central banks more into its
operations, with the increasing significance of emerging markets in capi-
tal markets. To accommodate the time difference with Europe, the BIS
Asia opened its Treasury Office in 2000 allowing more efficient reserve
management of Asian central banks.40
The BIS Asia has also been actively involved in promoting central bank
cooperation in Asia, as its headquarters does for all central banks. As a
result, it has been working with EMEAP working groups on research and
reports.4 1 It has also been represented in various conferences on the sub-
ject of financial cooperation.
But there is the possibility of BIS Asia playing a leading role in the
regional financial response. While the Basel headquarters does not pro-
vide direct financial assistance to central banks, it acts as a catalyst for
financial assistance through bilateral swap agreements among G10 coun-
tries.42 The BIS Asia is keen on asserting its role as a potential institu-
tional basis for any regional financial cooperative forum. Some of the
39. The reports that the three working groups have been producing have been influen-
tial on the outlook of the EMEAP markets as they reflect a somewhat collective
analysis by the central banks. The work of the working group central bank
reserves has been especially important leading to the Asian Bond Fund that is
discussed below. As discussed below, the creation of an Asian bond fund has been
instrumental. What is EMEAP?, supra note 32.
40. Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Opening of the BIS Asia Pa-
cific Regional Treasury Dealing Room (Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://www.bis.
org/press/p001031a.htm.
41. This was touched upon in a paper by Robert McCauley, Deputy Chief Representa-
tive of BIS Asia. Robert McCauley, Central Bank Cooperation in East Asia, The
2nd Annual Conference of PECC Finance Forum (July 8-9, 2003), available at
http://www.pecc.org/finance/forum2003-content.htm.
42. The G10 bilateral swap agreements were exchanged during the 1960s at the time
when payment imbalances and market pressures were threatening the fixed ex-
change rate regime.
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papers presented from staff members of BIS Asia imply this intention.
43
Further, the BIS Asia is the secretariat for the Asia Consultative Council
(ACC), which was created in early 2001. The ACC is a vehicle for com-
munication between shareholding central banks in Asia and the Pacific
and the Board of Directors and Management of BIS. It furnishes a win-
dow of opportunity for Asian central banks to express views to the BIS.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A REGIONAL STABILITY FUND
The idea of a regional stability fund has floated since the Asian finan-
cial crisis.44 For example, one Japanese Finance Ministry was enthusiastic
to establish an Asian Monetary Fund to support the Asian crisis coun-
tries. 45 The range of proposals has varied significantly, but the common
theme is to create a fund that is exclusive to Asia, maintaining the deci-
sion making within Asia as well. This reflects a strong suspicion towards
the decision making of the major international financial institutions,
which are dominated by the United States. Some have gone as far as
proposing an Asian monetary union or common currency.
46
The United States did not support the idea, claiming that funds were
likely to be lent on lax terms that could be damaging in the long-run.47
The idea of the Fund was replaced by a Japanese fund, the New
Miyazawa Plan, offering a total of $30 billion in credit guarantees to help
Asian countries. 4 8
It is likely that the United States' opposition towards an Asian mone-
tary fund was not only based on its perception of laxer conditionality of
funds, but also on the political consequences of being excluded from the
its decision-making process. On other occasions, the U.S. Treasury has
been critical of economic cooperation in areas where it can neither exert
43. McCauley, supra note 41, at § 2.
44. The proposal for an Asian Stability Fund was made as early as the end of 1997.
While some advocates also went as far as proposing an Asian monetary union, as
the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Joseph Yam, most were
based on a regional monetary fund that would supplement the IMF.
45. The then Finance Minister Miyazawa sought to establish such a fund for Asia.
46. Louise Lucas, HK Bank Chief Argues for Asian Monetary Union, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1999, at 2. An Asian common currency was discussed at the ASEAN summit
meeting as a possible option in the future, although not included in the ASEAN
Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation for the Third Informal Summit Meet-
ing. Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Statement on
East Asia Cooperation, (Nov. 28, 1999), available at http://www.aseansec.org/691.
htm. The then president Joseph Estrada reportedly said "[i]f we preserve and
work harder, maybe we will fulfill an even loftier dream ... One East Asian cur-
rency." Ted Bardacke, East Asian Nations Reach Accords on Further Co-opera-
tion, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 8.
47. See Gillian Tett, Japan Seeks Asian Monetary Fund, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998 at
10.
48. The New Miyazawa Initiative was extended to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand for a total amount of $21 billion as of February 2000.
Press Release, Ministry of Finance Japan, A New Initiative to Overcome the Asian
Currency Crisis: New Miyazawa Initiative, available at http://www.mof.go.jp/
english/iftele042a.htm.
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influence nor produce practical results to its liking.49
The idea of an Asian regional stability fund continues to be discussed.
For example, an ADB has been involved in contemplating its institutional
aspect.50 Japan has established a Finance Ministerial Advisory Group to
discuss the establishment of an Asian monetary fund designed to prevent
financial crises. 51 Whether or not such a fund will actually be established
will depend on the economic climate, leadership, and legitimacy discussed
in the following section. There is great need for such a fund, and the lack
of institutionalization further supports the need for the dialogue on finan-
cial policy among the Asian countries.
V. SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL COOPERATION LEADING
TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Since the Asian financial crisis, there has been a wave of proposals re-
lated to financial cooperation in East Asia. This wave was initiated by
the Japanese proposal to establish a regional stability fund and substanti-
ated in the past five years. Both considerations of political economy and
the mindset of Asian countries have evolved during this time. The fol-
lowing section discusses some of the significant developments that have
taken place since 1998.
A. POLITICAL ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS
The political climate in Asia towards a collective response to financial
instability has fluctuated remarkably since 1998. As discussed above, 52
the Japanese proposal for a regional stability fund was rejected as a result
of not only opposition from the United States, but also Chinese caution
over Japanese leadership in an institutional structure in Asia.
But as the economic upheaval of the Asian financial crises settles,
Asian governments are increasingly favourable of setting up an Asian so-
lution to financial stability. There is greater political will in most Asian
governments to cooperate more closely in terms of financial and institu-
49. The United States was opposed to the repurchase agreement of U.S. treasury bills
between EMEAP members because the currency provided would be U.S. dollars
and would influence their money supply. The United States has been eager to join
the EMEAP due to its influential and close membership, but has been rejected
throughout. Thus, it is likely that the United States intended to use the repurchase
agreement case to negotiate its membership. Also, the U.S. dollars lent for the
repurchase agreement would be from the foreign exchange reserve of the member
central bank and thus not under the control of the United States. As a matter of
courtesy, it is likely that the U.S. Treasury would be notified if the amount of U.S.
dollars lent were substantial and likely to affect the U.S. economy. But the repur-
chase itself does not invoke the notification.
50. ADB Institute, Regional Arrangements for Strengthening Financial Architecture in
Asia, Asian Development Forum-ADB Institute Workshop 2 No. S19/00, (June
5-8,2000), available at http://lib.adbi.org/PDF/ess/essl9.pdf.
51. Finance Ministry Discusses Asian Monetary Fund Proposal, YOMIURI NEWS (Jan.
17, 2000).
52. See Tett, supra note 46.
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tional assistance to each other.53
The strongest development in this respect has been the change within
the Chinese administration's view towards a regional response. The Chi-
nese have since embraced the idea of participating in regional financial
cooperation to gain leadership in the developments while recognizing the
threat of financial instability as fluid capital movements take place.54
There is also strong acknowledgement, through the various reports
published, that the root cause of the Asian financial crisis was the asset
and liability mismatch of foreign capital. 55 Asian governments have re-
sponded by accumulating large foreign reserves to avoid any currency
speculation,5 6 but simultaneously the governments seem to recognize that
there is a strong need to develop a regional capital market for financing.57
Further, most Asian countries boast a high savings rate but have seen
the overseas investment of these funds. Together with the large foreign
reserves of the central banks, the logical conclusion is to develop regional
capital markets that would enable Asian funds to be invested within. This
has been recommended not only by an EMEAP working group 58 but also
by various other authors on the subject.59
The other development is the change in external opinion on the estab-
lishment of a regional stability fund. Since the change in administration,
the United States has since encouraged the Asian governments to con-
sider possible regional responses to financial instability. 60 The one condi-
53. Pradumna B. Rana, Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia: The Chang
Mai Initiative and Beyond, (ADB ERD Working Paper Series No. 6, 2002), availa-
ble at www.abd.orgfDoctuments/ERD/Working-Papers/wp006.pdf; Barry Eichen-
green, Whither Monetary and Financial Cooperation in Asia?, PECC Finance
Forum Conference 1-3 (Aug. 11-13, 2002) available at http://www.pec.org/finance/
forum2003-content.htm.
54. See Eichengreen, supra note 53, at 2.
55. Id.; See Shinichi Yoshikuni, "Asian Capital Flow and ABF" (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); Rana supra, note 52; Kenichiro Watanabe et al.,
The Effectiveness of Capital Controls and Monitoring: The Case of Non-Interna-
tionalization of Emerging Market Currencies (Jan. 2002) (EMEAP Discussion Pa-
per), available at http://www.emeap.org.
56. The foreign reserve of Asian countries which stood at $200 billion immediately
after the Asian financial crisis is now a staggering $900 billion. This is 40% of the
world foreign reserve and if Japan is included, the Asians' have 60% of the world's
foreign reserve. See Yoshikuni, supra note 55.
57. Because the foreign reserves are large relative to the size of trade and GDP, their
size in itself are inefficient. Actual efforts to promote capital markets are dis-
cussed infra § V.C.
58. Press Statement, EMEAP, EMEAP Central Banks to Launch Asian Bond Fund,
(June 2, 2003), available at http://www.emeap.org.
59. C. RANDALL HENNING, EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL COOPERATION 5-8 (Institute for
International Economics 2002) [hereinafter Henning, EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL
COOPERATION].
60. The U.S. Assistant Secretary for international affairs at the Treasury, Edwin Tru-
man, took a non-committal line at the 2000 ADB Annual General Meeting that
regional initiatives such as CMI could well be constructive in principle, and greater
cooperation among Asian countries was perfectly appropriate. Press Release, Ed-
win M. Truman, Assistant Secretary of U.S. Treasury (International Affairs), Re-
marks to the Asian Development Bank, 33rd Annual Meeting in Chiang Mai,
Thailand (May 7, 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ls610.htm.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA
tion of any regional response is that the conditionality of the IMLF is not
compromised for any financial assistance provided.61
In conjunction with the shift in the United States' attitude, the IMF has
also changed its response to regional responses.62 The IMF's response to
any regional financial cooperation has been that this would be comple-
mentary to the IMIF assistance, which would effectively require any re-
gional response to be in tandem with IMF conditionality. 63
Many commentators advocate the establishment of a regional mone-
tary fund,64 a tied currency,65 or ultimately, a currency union. The
ADB's new president, Haruhiko Kuroda, recently outlined a five step
plan for achieving a currency union in Asia during his service as adviser
to the Japanese cabinet. The plan involves pooling foreign reserves,
which is already under way under the CMI, the continuing development
of local currency bond markets, the signing of FTAs, interim measures to
stabilize Asian currencies against each other, and finally, monetary
union.66 Mr Kuroda, in his role as President of ADB, still foresees cur-
rency union taking place, albeit in twenty to thirty years. 67 A former Chi-
nese trade representative has also echoed the need for an Asian currency
in the long term.68
Another aspect in relation to the co-existence of Asian regional coop-
eration and the IMF is the now wide-spread view that this co-existence
can be complementary. Previously, one of the criticisms of an Asian
Fund was duplication of the IMF's function. But various reasons have
been provided for their complementing functions: limitation of IMF fund-
61. CMI reflects this concern only allowing 10% of its funds not to be linked to IMF
conditions. Seok-Dong Wang & Lene Andersen, Regional Financial Cooperation
in East Asia: the Chaing Mai Initiative and Beyond, in U.N. ECON.& Soc. COMM'N
FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, BULLETIN ON ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 2002/03,
available at http://www.unescap.org/publications/detain.asp?id=6.
62. The IMF's Managing Director, Horst Kohler commented that "[o]ur advice [to the
East Asian region] is to pursue regionalization, not in opposition to the IMF, be-
cause the IMF is a global institution, but to do it in a complementary fashion. That
is exactly what is happening now and its makes a lot of sense." Interview with
Horst Kohler, Far E. Econ. Rev. 48-50 (June 14, 2001); See also Henning, EAST
ASIAN FINANCIAL COOPERATION, supra note 58, at 48.
63. The IMF representatives have been satisfied with the CMI arrangements, which
would reflect, in most parts, IMF conditionality.
64. Martin Wolf, Asia Needs the Freedom of its Own Monetary Fund, FIN. TIMES, May
19, 2004.
65. Steve Johnson & Victor Mallet, JP MORGAN TO CALL FOR TIED ASIAN CURREN-
CIES, FIN. TIMES, Jan, 31, 2005.
66. Victor Mallet, Closer E Asian Financial Ties Ahead, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2004.
67. Press Conference with ADB President Haruhiko Kuroda (Feb. 8, 2005), available
at http://www.adb.org/documents/transcripts/2005/tr2005001.asp.
68. Sekai boueki seido no saikouchiku [Restructure of the World System: Interview
with Former Chinese Trade Representative Ryu Eizu], Nihon Keizai Newspaper
(in Japanese) (Jan. 11, 2005).
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ing,69 uncertainty in U.S. support of IMF,7° and complementary exper-
tise.71 Thus, the two institutions may create useful redundancy.72 A
more recent development is the imbalance created as a result of the large
accumulation of U.S. dollar assets by Asian central banks.
B. CMI
The CMI was proposed in May 2000 in Chang Mai of Northern Thai-
land by the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers. The CMI called for:73
" An expanded ASEAN swap arrangement that would include all
ASEAN countries and a network of bilateral swap and repurchase
agreement (BSA) facilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan
and Korea.
" Use of the ASEAN+3 framework to promote the exchange of consis-
tent and timely data and information on capital flows.
" Establishment of a regional financing arrangement to supplement
existing international facilities.
" Establishment of an appropriate mechanism (early warning system)
that could enhance the ability to provide sufficient and timely finan-
cial stability in the East Asian region.
The ASEAN swap agreement has existed since the 1970s, but the CMI
expanded this arrangement to include all ASEAN members instead of
just Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The
total amount was also increased from $200 million to $1 billion, where
double the amount of contribution can be drawn upon for six months.74
The interest rate applicable to yen and euro are the respective base rates
of euro yen and euro LIBOR rates.
The network of BSA is a facility designed to provide short-term liquid-
ity assistance in forms of swaps of U.S. dollars with the domestic curren-
cies of participating countries. A BSA can be drawn upon for a period of
ninety days. The interest rate applicable is LIBOR plus a premium of 150
basis points for the first and the first renewal drawings. 75 The BSA is
complementary to the IMF's assistance in that drawing countries are re-
69. Wendy Dobson, The Case for Regional Financial and Monetary Cooperation in the
PECC Economies: Background Issues and Questions for Inquiry, PECC Finance
Forum Conference (Aug. 11-13, 2002), available at http://www.pecc.org/finance/fo-
rum2003-content.htm.
70. C. Randall Henning, The Case for Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia,
PECC Finance Forum Conference (Aug. 11-13, 2002), available at http://www.pecc.
org/finance/forum2003-content.htm [hereinafter Henning, The Case for Regional
Financial Cooperation in East Asia].
71. Rana, supra note 53, at 5.
72. See Henning, The Case for Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia, supra note
70, at 2.
73. Rana, supra note 52, at 8; Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting,
(May 6, 2000) available at http://www.aseansec.org/635.htm.
74. Rana, supra note 52, at 9
75. Id.
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quired to accept IMF adjustment programs. There is, however, an auto-
matic disbursement of up to 10 percent of the maximum amount of
drawing without any IMF conditionality. Subsequently, after the
ASEAN+3 summit meeting in November 2000, China, Japan, and Korea
started to negotiate BSAs with ASEAN countries.
The CMI efforts toward regional surveillance follow the developments
of the Manila Framework and the ASEAN Surveillance Process. The
ASEAN+3 Surveillance Process, which was initiated in May 2000, is simi-
lar to the ASEAN Surveillance Process. In addition to macroeconomic
aggregates and exchange rates, sectoral and social policies are monitored.
Finance Ministers meet twice a year for policy coordination under the
ASEAN+3 Surveillance Process.
More importantly, ASEAN+3 is developing an early warning system. 76
This would assist in systematically detecting financial and corporate fra-
gilities regionally.
C. ABF AND EMEAP
The Working Group of Financial Markets of the EMEAP had been
proposing the establishment of an ABF to promote regional bond mar-
kets. The establishment of ABF was announced on June 2, 2003, leading
to the various funds now in operation. 77
The cause of the Asian financial crisis was the maturity mismatch of
capital flows. Because of the lack of well developed local currency mar-
kets, Asians were also forced to borrow in foreign currencies. This made
the Asian economies more vulnerable to speculative attacks.78 On the
other hand, since the financial crises, Asians have been investing in low-
yielding foreign assets, and foreigners have been investing in higher-
yielding assets in domestic markets of the region. Asian savings are being
sent abroad only to be invested in riskier domestic assets. Financial inter-
mediation is being carried out in foreign markets. 79 This is an inefficient
use of capital in the eyes of Asians. It also heightens the risk profile as
locals would be better informed of the local markets than foreigners.
ABF was set up under such considerations. By investing in long-term
notes and bonds of issuers in the region, the ABF would encourage
longer-term funding and underscore the common interest in less fragile
balance sheets.8 0 In addition, the development of a regional bond market
76. Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Ministerial State-
ment of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/2775.htm.
77. Press Statement, EMEAP Central Banks to Launch Asian Bond Fund, supra note
57.
78. Guonan Ma & Eli M. Remolona, Opening Markets Through a Regional Bond
Fund: Lessons from ABF2, BIS QUARTERLY REV., June 2005, at 81, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdfrqt0506.pdf.
79. Robert N. McCauley, Capital Flows in East Asian Since the 1997 Crisis, BIS QUAR-
TERLY REV., June 2003, at 41, 45, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r-qt
0306.pdf.
80. See McCauley, supra note 41, at 5.
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would contribute both to the provision of a variety of investment options
for Asian central banks' reserve management and to the efficient use of
the savings generated in the region.81
The ABF has been extended to regional currency denominated bonds,
which would further assist the development of regional bond markets.
The ABF is an important step towards a coordinate effort to develop
longer-term financing instruments. It also collaborates two central bank
fora, EMEAP and BIS Asia, bringing their activities in line and limiting
redundancy.
Phase One of ABF pools the contribution of $1 billion from foreign
reserves of EMEAP central banks. This is then invested in U.S. dollar
denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers of
eight EMEAP economies.82 The ABF is managed passively by BIS Asia
in accordance with a specific benchmark.
Phase Two of the ABF has now been launched (ABF2).83 ABF2 will
invest $2 billion of EMEAP central bank reserves in local currency de-
nominated sovereign and quasi-sovereign issues in the same eight
EMEAP economies. ABF2 comprises two components: a Pan-Asian
Bond Index Fund (PAW) and the eight single-market funds. PAW is a
single-index bond fund investing in sovereign and quasi-sovereign domes-
tic currency denominated bonds issued in the eight EMEAP markets.
The single market funds will each invest in the respective local currency
bond market.84 Each of the nine funds will replicate a bond index pro-
vided by a third party, the International Index Company.
Private sector fund managers have been appointed to individually man-
age PAIF and the eight single market funds.85 Each fund will be opened
to institutional and retail investors over the coming few months. The
Hong Kong fund was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on June
21, 2005, and PAW became available to the public on July 7, 2005.86 Both
funds have attracted institutional investors, and investment in the fund
increased by 10 percent on the first date of listing.87
81. Yoshikuni, supra note 55, at § 4.
82. ABF excludes investments in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.
83. Press Statement, EMEAP, The Asian Bond Fund 2 Has Moved into Implementa-
tion Phase, (May 12, 2005), available at http://emeap.org/press/12may05.htm.
84. See Press Statement, EMEAP, EMEAP Central Banks Announce the Launch of
Asian Bond Fund 2, (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://emeap.org/press/16dec04.
htm (outlining structure of funds).
85. Press Release, The Asian Bond Fund 2 Has Moved into Implementation Phase,
supra note 832.
86. Eiji Hirano, Bank of Japan Executive Director, The Asian Bond Fund and the
Development of an Asian Bond Market, Lunch Keynote Address at the ADB
Institute Conference: Developing Bond Markets in APEC-Toward Public-Private
Sector Regional Partnership (June 22, 2005).
87. Interview with Mr. Atsushi Takeuchi, Head of International Finance Cooperation
Section, International Department, Bank of Japan.
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D. ASIAN BOND MARKET INITIATIVE (ABMI)
The ASEAN+3 ABMI was endorsed at the ASEAN+3 Deputies Meet-
ing in Chiang Mai, Thailand on December 17, 2002, with the objective of
developing efficient bond markets in Asia, which would enable the pri-
vate and public sectors to raise and invest long-term capital without cur-
rency and maturity risks. The ABMI emphasizes two broad areas:
facilitating access to the market by a wide variety of issuers and creating
an environment conducive to developing bond markets. ABMI has set
up six working groups to address a broad range of issues related to local
bond markets in Asia.88
There have been various incremental developments taking place as a
result of the work of ABMI. These include: issuance of Ringgit-denomi-
nated bonds by the ADB and the International Finance Corporation in
Malaysia in November and December 2004; issuance of cross-country pri-
mary collateralized bond obligations (named Pan-Asia Bond) by Korea
and Japan in December 2004; provision of credit guarantees by Japan
Bank for International Cooperation for bonds issued by an Asian mul-
tinational company in Thailand in June 2004; and Launch of the Asian
Bonds Online Website in May 2004.89
E. APEC REGIONAL BOND MARKET INITIATIVE
APEC has been working in the area of development of securitization
and credit guarantee markets since September 2002. The initiative aims
to identify impediments to securitization and credit guarantee markets in
APEC economies and propose appropriate solutions. This forum is used
as a high-level policy dialogue to promote these initiatives. 90
F. EAST ASIA SUMMIT (EAS)
As a footnote to the above economic and financial developments in the
region, the Asian community is keen on promoting general exchanges
within the region. Such a move would be the holding of the EAS in Ku-
ala Lumpur, Malaysia in November 2005. The objective of the EAS is to
88. This consists of the Focal Group (Stete), the Ad-hoc Support Team for FG, TA
Coordination Team for FG, Working Group (WG) on New Securitised Debt In-
strument, WG on Credit Guarantees and Investment Mechanisms, WG Foreign
Exchange Transactions and Settlement, and WG Rating Systems. Press Release,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Chairman's Press Release on the Asian
Bond Markets Initiative, available at http://www.aseansec.org/15030.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2005).
89. Press Release, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The Joint Ministerial
Statement of the 8th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, (May 4, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.aseansec.org/17449.htm.
90. See AsianBondsOnLine, APEC Regional Bond Market Initiative, http://asian
bondsonline.adb.org/regional/asean %203_asian-bond_markets_initiative/related-
initiatives/apecjregional bondmarketinitiative.php (last visited Aug. 22, 2005).
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transform ASEAN into a wider region, namely ASEAN+3. 91
But there have been disagreements on the membership and structure
of the EAS.92 Besides China, Japan, and Korea that would become mem-
bers, there is disagreement in whether to invite India, Australia, and New
Zealand.
G. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION AS TO THE SEAT OF A
REGIONAL STABILITY FUND
The discussions on the various regional fora that consider regional fi-
nancial cooperation have become numerous in recent years, which was
not so a decade ago. This signifies a momentum that was not present in
Asian regional integration previously. The Asian financial crisis has truly
spurred financial leaders to contemplate a regional response to financial
difficulties, as they experienced in 1997 and 1998.
Nevertheless, this mushrooming of regimes of financial cooperation
has, in a sense, led to institutional competition for the seat of a Regional
Stability Fund. The possible redundancy is an area that the Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation Council Finance Forum 93 has been addressing. 94 In
addition to these East Asia-wide fora, there are also a number of sub-
regional groupings emerging.95
Institutional competition, at this point in time, may help improve the
expertise and reconsider the functions of each institution. The efforts of
each forum on the bond market initiatives are complementary. 96 But in-
stitutions will have to be rationalized in the long-run to either merge simi-
91. Press Release, Chairman's Statement of the 8th ASEAN + 3 Summit, Strengthen-
ing ASEAN + 3 Cooperation, (Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://www.aseansec.
org/16848.htm.
92. Eric Teo Chu Cheow, E. Asia Summit Birthing Pains, States Inside and Outside
ASEAN Split Over Which Countries to Include, Straits Time, Feb. 22, 2005.
93. The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council was established in 1980 by the then
Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia for discussion on policy issues in the region
among business, government, and academia. PECC, Introduction & History,
http://www.pecc.org/about.pecc.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
94. See PECC, Financial and Monetary Cooperation, http://pecc.org/finance/fmc-con-
tent.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2005) (discussing financial cooperation).
95. Many of the sub-regional cooperation fora are called growth triangles or growth
areas and are mainly concerned with transnational movement of capital, labor,
technology, and information, and on inter-country provision of infrastructure
rather than on trade in goods and services. They are mainly privative initiatives
with the government providing the basic infrastructure and a conducive policy en-
vironment. While the significance of these sub-regional groups is still limited, with
the economic growth of these areas, the importance will increase giving rise to the
consideration of whether these countries should be included in any financial coop-
eration effort in the future. Important growth areas are: Brunei Darussalam-Indo-
nesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area, Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand Growth Triangle, Greater Mekong Subregion (Cambodia, Lao PDR, My-
anmar, and Vietnam), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Pacific Cooperation
Forum (Fiji and Papua New Guinea) and South Asia Subregional Economic Coop-
eration (Indian, Bangladesh, and Nepal). See MOVING REGIONAL COOPERATION
FORWARD, supra note 21.
96. Ma & Remolona, supra note 77, at 84.
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lar functions or create a division of labor among the institutions. This is
the strongest with the ASEAN secretariat, ADB, and EMEAP secreta-
riat. As ASEAN evolves towards the ASEAN+3 model, and eventually
EAS, the redundancy of economies covered by EMEAP will increase.
ADB is emphasizing the developmental aspect of regional cooperation to
assert its position.97
Barry Eichengreen has proposed an Asian Financial Institute (AFI)
based on the ASEAN+3 model.98 AFI would provide technical assis-
tance and training to member bank regulators. More importantly, AFI
would also provide reserve management, clearing, and settlement ser-
vices to member central banks. But as the Deputy Chief Representative
of BIS Asia rightly points out, the former functions exist in the form of
SEACEN, 99 a regional central bank training institute, and SEANZA, an
Asia-Pacific central bank training programme. 100 Further, BIS Asia is
now providing treasury services in Asia. ABD provides technical assis-
tance to developing member countries. The functions of AFI, except for
clearing and settlement, 101 already exist in Asia, although dispersed
among various institutions. Some senior figures in the community fore-
see BIS Asia and EMEAP merging and becoming the institutional basis
for any regional stability fund.102 This would include one of the most
important financial centers in Asia, Hong Kong, which would not be rep-
resented by the ASEAN+3 model, although China would be. The specu-
lation toward the direction of an Asian fund is certainly mounting among
the Asian central banking circle.
VI. EFFECTS ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY, LAW AND
REGULATION, AND POLITICS
In the international monetary field, countries have not strongly insisted
on sovereignty since the Bretton Woods institutions were established in
1946. Sovereignty of nations is not the monopoly of the national domain,
as was recognized in an individual opinion of a judge of the International
Court of Justice, when he noted that: "We can no longer regard sover-
eignty as an absolute and individual right of every State, as used to be
done under the old law founded on the individualist r6gime, according to
97. MOVING REGIONAL COOPERATION FORWARD, supra note 21.
98. See Eichengreen, supra note 53, at 19-20.
99. SEACEN is the South East Asia Central Banks group was established in 1966.
Member central banks are Ministry of Finance Brunei Darussalam, National Bank
of Cambodia Reserve Bank of Fiji, Bank Indonesia, The Bank of Korea, Bank
Negara Malaysia, The Bank of Mongolia, Central Bank of Myanmar, Nepal Rastra
Bank, Bank of Papua New Guinea. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Au-
thority of Singapore, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, The Central Bank of China,
Taipei, Bank of Thailand. Its main function is a regional training centre for central
banks.
100. See McCauley, supra note 41, at 3.
101. Although, linkage of clearing and settlement systems has been taking place among
some central banks as well. Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Reserve
Bank of Australia have been especially enthusiastic in this area.
102. Interview with Mr. Shinichi Yoshikuni, Chief Representative of BIS Asia.
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which States were only bound by the rules they had accepted.' 10 3 This is
especially true in the area of monetary sovereignty, 0 4 and to assume that
sovereignty will be preserved within the national domain is perhaps
unrealistic.
The IMF's Articles recognize monetary sovereignty of member states
with the Second Amendment. 10 5 At the same time, the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF are the main sources that limit monetary sover-
eignty in the international scene. 10 6 Members essentially agreed to limit
their monetary sovereignty for the good of the overall international mon-
etary system.107
More recently, the changing nature of international law has been cap-
tured by the increasing use of soft law as an attempt to accommodate
evolutionary stages of international legal process in relation to the chang-
ing nature of sovereignty. 10 8 Examples include instances such as in the
EU where presently the direction of legislation is determined within a
regional sphere.
The lessons and experiences of other institutions, such as the IMF and
EU, should be drawn upon when we examine functions which would be
beneficial and feasible for financial stability. Law provides an important
foundation for the sound operation of any market. But law cannot oper-
ate separately from the society on which it is based. Law needs to be
viewed in the context of what is socially desirable. 10 9 As Allott states:
"Law carries a society's idea of its own future from the past into the fu-
ture.""10 East Asian regional financial regulation should also be consid-
103. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion by
Judge Alvarez).
104. Especially given the case of EMU and other currency arrangements such as dol-
larization and currency board systems.
105. With the inclusion of Article IV, section 3(b) which reads "shall respect the domes-
tic social and political policies of members, and in applying these principles the
Fund shall pay due regard to the circumstances of members" (emphasis added).
This was included as a result of the Second Amendment which abolished the previ-
ously more assertive approach of the Articles of Agreement on monetary sover-
eignty to maintain the par value system. U.N. Monetary & Fin. Conference,
Bretton Woods, N.H., July 22, 1944, Articles of the International Monetary Fund
art. IV § 3(b), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa [hereinafter IMF
Articles of Agreement]; Tullio Treves, Monetary Sovereignty Today, in INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 114 (Mario Giova-
noli ed., 2000).
106. Article IV, section 1 states that members must limit certain areas of their eco-
nomic, financial, and exchange rate policy in order to facilitate exchange rate sta-
bility. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 103, at art. IV § 1.
107. In the countries affected by the Asian financial crisis, they have gone further and
prescribed to labor reform (Korea) and social safety nets (Indonesia) as a result of
agreements with the IMF.
108. Wolfgang H. Reinicke & Jan Martin Witte, Interdependence, Globalization, and
Sovereignty: The Role of Non-Binding International Legal Accords, in COMMIT-
MENT AND COMPLIANCE (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). Here, the external element of
sovereignty is undermined by the globalization of corporate activities.
109. Philip Allott, The True Function of Law in the International Community, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL L. STUD. 396 (1998).
110. Id. at 399.
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ered in this context.
Monetary sovereignty does not exist in the vacuum of domestic legal
procedures but will be well influenced by the needs of the economic and
political developments. While markets can develop to accommodate the
existing legal and regulatory structure,"' a normative approach is being
taken by the policy-makers in Asia to accommodate what the market-
place should be. This is a change in the legal approach with financial
regulators shifting their emphasis from their previous passive role to a
more active role in creating market infrastructure. The various working
groups have been instrumental in bringing about the changes in this atti-
tude by identifying impediments and creating incentives to amend them.
The Study of Impediments to Cross-Border Bond Investment and Issu-
ance in Asian Countries highlights many of the impediments that private
investors feel when investing in the local bond markets. 112 Some of the
impediments that were raised in the survey are restrictions on the
purchase and selling of local bonds by non-residents. Taxation has a sig-
nificant impact on the development of bond markets in general, as capital
gains taxes frequently provide a disincentive for trading bonds, which re-
duce arbitrage opportunities. Withholding taxes on interest income to
foreign investors would reduce returns from holding bonds. Withholding
taxes on interest income is charged in a number of countries in Asia,
though the tax rates are not critically high and tax reclaim procedures are
complicated in many countries. Transparency in regulations is important
for non-residents who are unfamiliar with the market and have language
barriers. While Singapore and Hong Kong score highly in this area, due
to an English-speaking business community, others score poorly in the
survey.
Hedging instruments shift the risk exposure to interest rate and foreign
exchange rate when purchasing local bonds. The introduction of capital
controls after the Asian crisis had the result of quashing the off-shore
foreign exchange derivatives market for local Asian currencies, which
was used for hedging currency risk.
Issuance of local bonds by non-residents is allowed in most Asian coun-
tries except China and Thailand. Nonetheless, actual issuance by non-
residents is negligible in many countries because of various requirements
that make local bond issuance less cost effective. Such requirements in-
clude local rating/local listing, use of local law as governing law, and prep-
aration of documentation in the local language.
Each jurisdiction is also bringing forward measures so that a fund dom-
iciled in one jurisdiction may be sold in another. This was an unexpected
reform made as a result of the PAIF. It will eventually be domiciled in
Singapore to take advantage of a number of factors including tax bene-
fits, but it was initially established in Hong Kong as there is a higher de-
111. See Press Conference With ADB President Haruhiko Kuroda, supra note 66.
112. Atsushi Takeuchi, "Study of Impediments to Cross-Border Bond Investment and
Issuance in Asian Countries" (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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gree of liquidity and depth in that market. Participating central banks
needed to cooperate in reconciling regulatory barriers.
Another dynamic of the efforts taking place is the incentive structure
to liberalize financial and capital markets among the various financial
regulators involved. This is described in detail by Guonan Ma and Eli M.
Remolona. 113 The establishment of ABF has induced EMEAP member
central banks to actively work toward the removal of impediments in
their local markets, and this collective effort, while incremental, has re-
sulted in efforts such as fast tracking market reforms. ' 14 The frequency of
meetings also contributed to the collective action in market liberalization.
Meetings have been held every month, with each member having to take
back homework to resolve by the next meeting. 115 This is a classical case
of the cooperation theory, which creates a possibility of the players meet-
ing again.' 16
The ABF also takes an incentive structure for further reducing market
impediments. This works because the portfolio weight in ABF2 for an
individual market rises as cross-border and local market impediments are
removed.1 17
The efforts can also be seen in relation to the provision of public goods
and the realization of the political economies of scale.118 As noted by
Jennifer Amyx, of the efforts taking place, the bond market initiatives
seem to be more enthusiastically pursued than others. 119 Central banks'
fora have the atmosphere of being club-like, with a clear mandate, which
often leads to financial regulation or establishment of infrastructure. 120
Central bankers usually have authority in their markets and are better
paid than civil servants. This common feature bonds central bankers.
The history of central bank cooperation dates back to the late nineteenth
century culminating in the establishment of the Bank for International
Settlement in 1930.121 This form of cooperative establishment of the
bond market infrastructure is leading to greater harmonization of finan-
cial regulation and may be a better form of law-making for Asia than the
EU method of directives. If the region were to follow Kuroda's vision
toward a regional currency, the law and regulation making mechanism
will have to be further devised.
113. See Ma & Remolona, supra note 78 at 86-90.
114. Id., at 86.
115. See Hirano, supra note 85.
116. ROBERT AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12 (Basic Books, Inc. 1984).
117. Ma & Remolona, supra note 78, at 86-90.
118. Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49
INT'L ORG. 595 (1995).
119. Jennifer A. Amyx, A Regional Bond Market for East Asia? The Evolving Political
Dynamics of Regional Financial Cooperation 20-21 (East Asian Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Finance Working Papers No. 383, 2004).
120. The author was previously an employee of the Bank of Japan and had the experi-
ence of attending various working party meetings of central bank gatherings.
121. Ethan B. Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics
of Regulatory Convergence, 46 INT'L ORG. 284 (1992).
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA
It is interesting to note that activities of EMEAP were on the brink of
being obscured in the aftermath of the crisis, crowded out by other re-
gional efforts and through disappointment with the lack of response by
Bank of Japan which spearheaded EMEAP. EMEAP only regained its
momentum in 2001, with the realization of the importance of strong and
deep markets, and the negotiations of the Basel II capital adequacy
framework. The latter rekindled the feeling of exclusion from the Basel
capital adequacy negotiations among Asian central banks, some monitor-
ing large financial and capital markets. In addition, new leadership was
brought forward to oversee EMEAP, especially within the Bank of Japan.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recurring theme of a regional stability fund in Asia gives rise to the
anxiety of states to resort to IMF assistance if financial troubles occur.
The Asian region lags behind in terms of regional integration relative to
other regions. This makes Asia an unlikely candidate for such an ambi-
tious project. But past experiences and strong political will develop re-
gional markets.
The law-making process is relatively informal and policy-oriented in
Asia. Thus, leadership becomes an essential ingredient for projects to
become successful. Of the various economic and financial groups that
exist in Asia, those that have a clear objective with key personnel seem to
function effectively. In tandem, the groups that operate on feasible
projects with mutual interest are those that work efficiently.
The bond market initiatives have created a strong law-making mecha-
nism within the region, with a competitive element that encourages regu-
lators to liberalize their regulation in accordance with the requirements
of the working groups. Many of the challenges that face the groups are
legal and regulatory, and resolutions of these will result in greater harmo-
nization of financial regulation in the region. The cooperation that is tak-
ing place encourages greater dialogue within the region, reinforcing
regional integration.
There still remains considerable political and legal obstacles to greater
regional integration. While financial stability is not yet an objective of
any of the regional fora, the underlying cause of all the efforts is to
achieve greater financial stability. Nevertheless, none of the working
groups deal directly with financial stability, regional stability fund, or
monetary sovereignty. This may be a subject that needs to be broached
to ensure further integration. Yet, with regulatory convergence already
taking place, greater harmonisation and eventual down-streaming of reg-
ulatory activities may provide for further discussion.
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